sales at the old price. Nevertheless, each decides to match the price increase, in the belief that doing so is more likely to enhance long-run profit. The stations have achieved a noncompetitive price by a series of consciously parallel decisions.
You might say that the gas stations in this scenario have formed "contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy" under Section 1. The first station's price increase is arguably an offer and the other stations' matching price increases are arguably acceptances. 6 Moreover, some of the Supreme Court's traditional definitions of concerted action under Section 1-a "conscious commitment to a common scheme" 7 or a Courts have also refused to extend Section 5 of the FTC Act to consciously parallel conduct, with or without facilitating practices, for similar reasons.
14 Unlike Section 1, Section 5 does not require an agreement; it requires only that the defendants have engaged in an unfair method of competition. But, as the previous paragraph shows, courts have refused to extend Section 1 to consciously parallel conduct because they believe that to do so would represent bad antitrust policy, not because they believe that the literal language of the statute forecloses that result. The same antitrust policy concerns apply in the interpretation of the broad language of Section 5. There is no reason to think conscious parallelism is "incipient" concerted action.
15
Consequently, both Section 5 and Section 1 are properly interpreted to require proof of concerted action.
There is no substantive gap. 15 Id. at 136-37 (holding that § 5 may bar "incipient" violations of the antitrust laws).
communications will usually only be available through discovery. Some courts do allow some pre-answer discovery on the merits.
20
I have argued elsewhere that this sort of discovery is appropriate, particularly where the allegations suggest that a focused factual inquiry might confirm whether the plaintiff could make sufficient allegations. But, to the extent that courts do not allow sufficient pre-answer discovery, the FTC might fill the procedural gap in appropriate cases by exercising its administrative powers of investigation.
Private parties who believe that they have been injured by concerted action, but who lack sufficiently detailed information to plead a violation of Section 1 under Twombly, can bring their evidence to the FTC either before filing suit or after dismissal of their action in federal court. The FTC, using its expertise in evaluating both economic and economic evidence, can decide whether to conduct further investigation. The FTC "was granted in its enabling statute broader powers of investigation than almost any other department or agency in the federal government." 21 For example, the FTC can informally request information from firms. 22 More important, under Section 9 of the FTC Act, the Commission may "require by subpoena the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of all such documentary evidence relating to any matter under unds.
investigation."
23
This provision allows the FTC to conduct what amounts to civil discovery before it has issued a complaint. Obviously, such a sweeping power raises risk of imposing undue costs on businesses. The FTC's own internal standards, however, provide procedural safeguards, which should be used to avoid abuses.
24
If the FTC finds evidence of concerted action, it can file a complaint 25 or, in the case of naked price fixing or market allocation, refer the case to the Antitrust Division for possible criminal prosecution. 26 Private parties may, in appropriate cases, file follow-on suits, relying on the additional information the FTC developed in order to satisfy the demands of Twombly. 27 One might argue that this division of responsibility is efficient.
Twombly may provide a useful screen against "impositional discovery" 28 by private plaintiffs, who necessarily consider only their private interest in deciding whether to sue.
29
If, however, Justice Stevens is correct that the screen will catch legitimate lawsuits, the FTC provides a forum to decide whether further discovery is justified on public interest gro 23 15 U.S.C. § 49. See also FTC OPERATING MANUAL, § 3.6.7.5.2 (describing criteria for issuance of subpoenas). 24 FTC OPERATING MANUAL, § 3.6.7.3 (requiring clearance and approval by a Bureau Director for compulsory process); § 3.6.7.5.7 (providing for petitions to quash or limit subpoenas). 25 Id. at § 4.2.2. 26 Id. at § 3.6.9. ANTITRUST DIVISION MANUAL VII-8 (2008) ("When a matter is before the FTC and the FTC determines that the facts may warrant criminal action against the parties involved, the FTC will notify the Division and make available to the Division the files of the investigation following an appropriate access request."), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter7.pdf. (1995) (observing that "private plaintiffs, particularly competitors, have every incentive to bring suit whenever the prospect of treble damages exceeds the costs of suit, regardless of the economic consequences").
